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CHAPTER 2 
Corporations 
SURVEY STAFFt 
§2.1. Corporate Promoters-Personal Liability. 0 In Massachusetts it 
is well established that promoters of intended but unformed cqrpora-
tions are personally liable on contracts entered into by them on behalf 
of the intended corporation.! Promoters may escape liability only if the 
contracting parties agree that only the corporation will be held liable 
on the contract,2 if the corporation subsequently ratifies the pre-incor-
poration agreement,3 or if a novation is created.4 To hold promoters 
liable, courts have traditionally employed several theories. Most juris-
dictions refer to agency principles and suggest that a promoter who acts 
for a non-existent principal is individually liable.5 Under this theory, 
courts reason that since the corporation remains unformed, no agency 
relationship with the promoter truly exists; the promoter's contract is 
thus personal, and he is individually responsible for his contract.6 Al-
ternatively, some courts hold that promoters are liable on their pre-
incorporation contracts as a breach of their implied warranty of authority 
to act on behalf of the intended corporation.7 Since the corporation 
remains unformed, it does not confer actual authority upon the promoter; 
t JOHN D. DONOVAN, JR., CLOVER M. DRINKWATER-LUNN, BARBARA JANE LE-
VINE, and DANIEL E. WRIGHT. 
§ 2.1. .. By John D. Donovan, Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHU-
SETTS LAW. 
! See, e.g., Hushion v. McBride, 296 Mass. 4, 10, 4 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1936); 
Mansfield v. Lang, 293 Mass. 386, 390-91, 200 N.E. 1l0, 113 (1936); Reuter v. 
Ballard, 267 Mass. 557, 562, 166 N.E. 822, 824 (1929); Storey v. Bickford, 
237 Mass. 284, 289, 129 N.E. 714, 716 (1921). See also 13 MASSACHUSETTS 
PRACTICE, PEAlRS, BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, §§ 221-23 (2d ed. 1971). 
2 Mansfield v. Lang, 293 Mass. 386, 391, 200 N.E. 1l0, 113 (1936). 
3 See, e.g., Storey v. Bickford, 237 Mass. 284, 288-89, 129 N.E. 714, 716 (1921). 
4 See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 306 (3d ed. 1959). 
5 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS [hereinafter cited 
as FLETCHER] § 215 (rev. ed. 1974). 
6 See Shell Oil CO. v. Hanchett, 18 Cal. App. 2d 240, 243, 63 P.2d 338, 339 
(1936); Nichols v. Bodenwein, 107 Fla. 25, 38-39, 146 So. 86, 91 (1932); Wells v. 
Fay & Egan Co., 143 Ga. 732, 733, 85 S.E. 873, 874 (1915); Strause v. Richmond 
Woodworking Co., 109 Va. 724, 731, 65 S.E. 659, 661 (1909); FLETCHER, supra 
note 5, at § 215; Isaacs, The Promoter: A Legislative Problem, 38 HARV. L. REv. 
887 (1925). 
7 See, e.g., Weiss v. Baum, 2,18 App. Div. 83, 86, 217 N.Y.S. 820, 822 (1926). 
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where no actual authority exists, personal liability is imJj>osed.8 Finally, 
courts have relied on theories of deceit, misrepresentatioh, and the doc-
trine of estoppel to impose personal liability on corpor!ate promotersY 
Thus, absent a ratification of a promoter's contract by the newly formed 
corporation or the inference of a novation, promoters remain personally 
liable on contracts entered into with third parties. In Massachusetts, as 
in most jurisdictions, personal liability of promoters is determined ac-
cording to the general rules of agency.l0 
A problem arises in the promoter context when an in(ended corpora-
tion has several promoters, each of whom may contract iwith third per-
sons. Determination of the liabilities inter se of the se~eral promoters 
depends upon a definition of the legal relationship whiclh the promoters 
bear to each other and upon the rights and duties whicH flow from that 
legal relationship.l1 During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court had an opportunity to define the nature of the legal 
relationship between the several promoters of an unformed corporation 
and to determine the various liabilities which are a consequence of that 
legal relationship.12 
In Productora E Importadora de PapeZ, S.A. de C.V. (*PSA) v. Flem-
ing,13 a Mexican corporation 14 had ordered newsprint from one Dietrich, 
a promoter of Trans-Milpak, Inc. ( TM ),15 a corporation formed in 
Massachusetts after the contract was executed.16 The ~romoter signed 
the contract on behalf of TM representing herself as T~1's president.17 
A second contract was subsequently entered into between PIPSA and 
another unformed corporation, Trans-Milpak International, Inc. (TMI).18 
This second agreement was negotiated and Signed by the Mexican agent 
8 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 215. 
9 See cases cited at 13 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, PEAIRS, BUSINESS CORPORA-
TIONS, § 222 (2d ed. 1971). 
10 See Mansfield v. Lang, 293 Mass. 386, 391,200 N.E. 110, 1P (1936); Reuter 
v. Ballard, 267 Mass. 557,562,166 N.E. 822, 824 (1929); Storey v. Bickford,237 
Mass. 284, 289, 129 N.E. 714, 716 (1921); 13 MASSACHUSETTS 'PRACTICE, PEAIRS, 
BUSINESS CoRPORATION, § 222 (2d ed. 1971). 
11 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. 
12 Productora E Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C.Y. v. Fleming, 1978 Miass. Adv. 
Sh. 3106, 383 N.E.2d 1129. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3106, 383 N.E.2d 1129. 
14 PIPSA is a "sociedad anomirna" organized pursuant to the General Laws of 
Mercantile Companies of the United States of MeJdco. Plaintiff's ctmplaint, reprinted 
in Supplemental Appendix to Defendant's Appeal, Appeals Court, No. 77-188, at 1 
(1977). i 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3107, 383 N.E.2d at 1132. . 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 3109, 383 N.E.2d at 1132. 
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of TMI's promoter, the defendant Fleming,19 who later became president 
of both TM and TMI. 20 Upon the failure of either TM or TMI to fulfill 
completely orders placed by PIPSA under the contracts, PIPSA filed an 
action of contract against each corporation, its officers, and the severa] 
promoters of the two corporations. 21 
In its complaint, PIPSA alleged that defendant Fleming, the president 
of TM and TMI, was personally liable on the two contracts as "pro-
moter and prospective incorporator" of the corporations.22 PIPSA fur-
ther asserted that by virtue of Fleming's promoter status alone he was 
liable for damages incurred under the two contracts.23 Upon defendant 
Fleming's failure to make discovery, the superior court entered a default 
judgment against him 24 and after a hearing to assess damages, entered 
final judgment.25 Fleming appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
ordered the case transferred from the Appeals Court on its own initia-
tive.26 Holding that the superior court had improperly failed to segre-
gate damages among the various defendants and the promoters of the 
two corporations, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed.27 
In considering the nature of the relationship between co-promoters of 
an unformed corporation, courts and commentators have developed sev-
eral views.28 Most jurisdictions take the position that co-promoters of 
an intended but unformed corporation are partners.29 Under this view 
19, ld. See Defendant's response to interrogatories, reprinted in Supple~ntal Ap-
pendix to Defendant's Appeal, Appeals Court No. 77-188. 
20 ld. at 3110-11, 383 N.E.2d at 1133. 
21 ld. at 3111, 383 N.E.2d at 1133. 
22 ld. See Count VI, Plaintiff's Complaint, reprinted in Supplemental Appendix 
to Defendant's Appeal, Appeals Court No. 77-188 at 10; Count X, id. at 20. 
23 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3112, 383 N.E.2d at ,1133. See MASS. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2)(C), 365 Mass. 797 (1974). 
24 See MASS. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2), 365 Mass. 822, (1974). 
25 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3112, 383 N.E.2d at 1134. Transfer to the Supreme 
Judicial Court was accomplished pursuant to G.L. c. 211A, § 10(a). 
26 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3128, 383 N.E.2d at 1140. 
27 In reversing the default judgment against defendant Fleming, the Court also 
relied on the fact that PIPSA had stated an erroneous theory of damages in its 
complaint. The Court held that a default judgment selVes only to establish the 
truth of factual allegations in a complaint; it does not operate as an absolute im-
position of liability. ld. at 3114,-15, 282 N.E.2d at 1134-35. See MASS. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2)(c); Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 
1206 (5th Cir. 1975). While these procedural grounds for the. Court's decision 
are significant, they are beyond the scope of this chapter of the Survey. 
28 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. 
29 ld. See, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 877, 43 
N.W.2d 718, 723 (1950); Sterne v. Fletcher American Co., 204 Ind. 35, 49, 181 
N.E. 37, 42 (1932); Johnson v. Hulse, 83 Cal. App. 111, 116, 256 P. 551, 554 
(1927); Graham Hotel Corp. v. Leader, 241 S.W. 700, 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); 
McRee v. Quitman Oil CO., 16 Ga. App. 12 (1915); Kennedy v. Fulton Mercantile 
Co., 33 Ky. L. R. 60, 62, 108 S.W. 948, 950 (1908). 
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co-promoters owe each other the fiduciary duties normally imposed by 
partnership relation 30 and may be held jointly and severally liable for 
each other's contracts.31 A partnership relation, however, does not How 
automatically from the co-equal standing of various promoters of a 
corporation.32 Co-promoters may agree to transform their legal status 
to an agency relationship 33 or to a joint adventure; 34 rights and duties 
consequently may vary with circumstances. As partners, co-promoters 
are liable for each other's acts notwithstanding their lack of consent.35 
In an agency relationship, however, the liability of one promoter for the 
other's act turns upon authority.36 Thus, under the majority view, the 
effect of status is significant. A minority of jurisdictions, on the other 
hand, hold that promoters are not partners, but that each operates 
individually.37 Courts in these jurisdictions presumably take the posi-
tion that although several promoters may undertake to develop a busi-
ness for profit, the promoters' immediate objective is the creation of an 
organization rather than mutual gain.38 Therefore, these courts reason, 
promoters do not fall within the general definition of partnership as 
co-ownership of a business for profit. 39 As a result, under this minority 
view, co-promoters are held to act as individuals, and they do not incur 
joint and several liability for acts of their fellow promoters.40 
In PIPSA, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the minority view, 
holding that co-promoters are not partners and that they are liable only 
on pre-incorporation contracts entered into individually on the corpo-
ration's behalf.41 The Court thus found that since defendant Fleming 
had not been involved in the PIPSA-TM agreement,42 he could not be 
held liable by virtue of his status as a TM promoter alone.43 The Court 
noted, however, that Fleming could have been held liable as a co-pro-
30 See Uniform Pal'tnership Act, C.L. c. 108A, §§ 1-44. 
31 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. See, e.g., Scuette v. W~nternitz, 498 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App. 1972). 
34 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. See, e.g., Abrams v. Puziss, 235 Ore. 60, 
62, 383 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1963). 
35 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191; C.L. c. 108A, § 15. 
36 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. 
37 See Mechem, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP § 29, at 31 (2d ed. 1920); Mid-
eastern Constr. Co. v. Hamlett, 14 N.C. App. 57, 187 S.E.2d 438, eert. denied, 281 
N.C. 621, 191 S.E.2d 758 (1972); Refrigeration Engineering Co. v. McKay, 4 Wash. 
App. 963, 486 P.2d 304 (1971), Daniel A. Pouwels & Assocs. v. Fiumara, 233 So. 
2d 16, (La. App. 1970); Carmody v. Powers, 60 Mich. 26, 26 N.W. 801 (1886). 
ct. Hushion v. McBride, 296 Mass. 4, 4 N.E.2d 443 (1936); Storey v. Bickford, 
237 Mass. 284, 129 N.E. 714 (.1921). 
38 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 189. 
39 C.L. c. 198, § 6. 
40 See cases cited at FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 191. 
41 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3117, 383 N.E.2d at 1.136. 
42 ld. at 3107, 383 N.E.2d at 1132. 
43 ld. at 3118, 383 N.E.2d at 1136. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/5
§2.1 CORPORATIONS 21 
moter had PIPSA demonstrated the existence of an alternative legal 
relationship between Fleming and his co-promoter.44 Had the PIPSA 
complaint alleged, for example, that Dietrich was Fleming's agent, or 
that Fleming, as promoter, had ratified the Dietrich-PIPSA contract, 
liability could have been imposed. Because the superior court had held 
Fleming liable on both contracts, however, without such a showing and 
had failed to segregate damages among the various defendants pursuant 
to the two agreements,45 the Supreme Judicial Court reversed.46 
To reach this result, the Court focused on the actual relationship which 
might exist between the several promoters of a corporation. The Court 
initially noted that the factual circumstances surrounding the co-promo-
tion of a new corporation might establish a relationship with legal con-
sequences. Under agency principles, for examples, co-promoters might 
be jOintly and severally liable for the acts of each other.47 Similarly, the 
Court observed, facts might demonstrate that co-promoters indeed were 
joint venturers,48 or that one promoter had ratified the other's act.49 The 
Court was thus unwilling to impose a single definition of the legal rela-
tionship which exists between co-promoters when factual circumstances 
might suggest a different legal status and yield a different legal result. 
Second, the Court observed that other states had adopted a similar ap-
proach.50 The Court cited three cases in which state courts declined to 
impose liability on a co-promoter absent a showing of a direct relation-
ship of agency, partnership, or joint venture, and defined the legal rela-
tionship of the several promoters according to the factual circumstances 
of the co-promotion. 51 The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with these 
cases and refused to hold defendant Fleming liable merely because of 
his status as TM's promoter.52 
44 ld. at 3117, 383 N.E.2d at 1136. 
45 ld. at 3118, 383 N.E.2d at 1136. 
46 ld. at 3128, 383 N.E.2d at 1140. The Court noted that Massachusetts law 
was applicable in this case notwithstanding the fact that the Trans-Milpak-PIPSA 
contract specified that Mexican law would apply in any dispute arising from the 
agreelllent. ld. at 3116 n.9, 383 N.E.2d at 1135 n.9. See C.L. c. 106 § 1-105. 
Since the parties had pleaded and tried the case under Massachusetts law, the 
Court declined to "disturb this tacit stipulation on the choice of law issues implicit 
in the case." See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc., 343 Mass. 
622, 625, 180 N.E.2d 88, 90-91 (1962); Tsacoyeanes v. Canadian Pacific RR, 339 
Mass. 726, 728, 162 N.E.2d 23, 24 (1959). ct. C.L. c. 33, § 70. 
47 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3117, 383 N.E.2d at 1136. 
48 ld. 
491d. 
50ld. 
51 Mideastern Constr. Co. v. Hamlett, 14 N.C. App. 57, 59, 187 S.E.2d 438, 440, 
cert. denied, 281 N.C. 621, 191 S.E.2d 758 (1972); Refrigeration Engineering Co. 
v. McKay, 4 Wash. App. 963, 975, 486 P.2d 304,312 (1971); Daniel A. Pouwels 
& Assocs. v. Fiumara, 233 So. 2d 16, 18 (La. App. 1970). 
52 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3117-18, 383 N.E.2d at 1136. 
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The result reached in PIPSA is appropriate for two Il'easons. First, 
courts should be reluctant to presume a legal relationship between in-
dividuals absent evidence of such a relation. The sound: view expressed 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in PIPSA permits plaintiffs to recover 
against co-promoters merely by establishing the existence of a relation-
ship between the co-promoters. Plaintiffs may demonstrate agency, joint 
venture, partnership, or ratification to establish joint and several liability. 
In PIPSA, for example, the Mexican firm might have introduced evidence 
that TM's promoter Dietrich acted on defendant FlemiI~g's instructions 
or that Fleming had ratified Dietrich's act. Moreover, even without such 
a showing, third parties retain their right to sue the act~al contracting 
promoter or the newly formed corporation under traditi~nal theories of 
promoter liability.53 Thus, PIPSA could stilI recover atainst Dietrich. 
Second, the result arrived at in PIPS A is correctly based on the facts of 
the case. Even had the Court adopted the majority view that co-pro-
moters are partners, no evidence of Fleming and Dietrich's co-promoter 
status was ever presented. PIPSA's complaint alleged that Fleming was 
liable to the Mexican corporation solely by virtue of his ~tatus as a TM 
promoter. 54 No allegation of co-promotion-with what¢ver legal rela-
tionship and consequence that might entail-was pleade4. Thus, Flem-
ing could not be held liable on the default judgment in ~avor of PIPSA 
on that count in any event. The Supreme Judicial COUl!t has therefore 
established an easily followed rule which appropriatelt balances the 
rights of third parties against the nature of the relationship between the 
several promoters of an unformed corporation. 
§2.2. Fiduciary Duty-Commercial Bank as a Trustee and Creditor." 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the ex-
tent to which a commercial bank owes a duty to beneficiaries of a cor-
porate voting trust when the bank functions in the dual roles of trustee 
of the corporate voting trust and creditor of the corpor*ion. The de-
fendant in 1'he First National Bank of Boston v. Slade 1 ~ad executed a 
guaranty for the obligations of a Massachusetts corporatioP, P.S. Thorsen 
Co., to the plaintiff bank.2 When the corporation, actin~ through Slade 
as president and treasurer, executed an assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, the bank brought an action to collect the remaining unpaid 
obligations of the corporation from Slade as guarantor.3 Slade defended 
the action upon the ground that the bank, as trustee of the voting trust 
53 See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra. . 
54 See Plaintiff's complaint, reprinted in Suprlemental Appendix to Defendant's 
Appeal, Appeals Court No. 77-188, at 10 (1977 . 
§ 2.2. " By Daniel E. Wright, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY o~ MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2509, 399 N.E.2d 1047. 
2 Id. at 2509, 399 N.E.2d at 1049. 
3 rd. 
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which held all the corporation's common stock, had violated its fiduciary 
duty owed to him as a trust beneficiary by collecting a portion of the 
corporation's obligations in its role as creditor.4 Slade claimed, there-
fore, that he was not liable under the guaranty and counterclaimed that 
the bank was liable to him for its breach of trust." The Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the superior court's entry of summary judgment in favor 
of the bank.6 
The complicated factual situation is best discussed in terms of the two 
roles assumed by the bank. One role was that of trustee of the voting 
trust. The corporation was formed in 1956, and its principal stockholder 
during these early years was William B. Wilkes.' In order to secure a 
smooth transition of corporate management from Wilkes to Slade, Wilkes 
and all other stockholders created a voting trust in September 1966, with 
the bank as trustee.S When Wilkes died in 1971, the bank, as trustee 
of the voting trust, assumed full voting control of the corporation. v As 
trustee, the bank was to remain in voting control of the corporation until 
the trust was terminated and Slade became principal stockholder.lo 
The other role assumed by the bank was that of creditor. The cor-
poration had been a loan customer of the bank for many years prior to 
the establishment of the voting trust in 1966.11 The corporation had out-
standing unsecured loans of approximately $200,000 from the bank, when, 
in May 1976, the company experienced a cash shortage.12 The bank 
4 ld. 
5 ld. 
6 ld. at 2510, 399 N.E.2d at 1049. 
7 ld. at 2512, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. 
8 ld. It appears that the trust was essentially an estate planning mechanism 
to enable a transfer of ownership of the corporation from the Wilkes family to 
Slade after Mr. Wilkes's death. ld. at 2512-13, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. The trust 
included a requirement that the corporation purchase the intexests of a deceased 
stockholder at a specified price. ld. at 2512, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. The trust agree-
ment further provided that the trust could be texminated only after the beneficial 
interests of Wilkes and his wife had been sold, and any indebtedness of the corpo-
ration created by such a sale was discharged. ld. In compliance with the trust 
agreement, the corporation undertook to purchase Wilkes's beneficial interest 
in the trust upon his death. ld. Additionally, in 1975 the corporation agreed to 
purchase Mrs. Wilkes's shares and beneficial interest in the trust. ld. The bank 
particiJ;>ated in the corporation's purchase of the stock both as coexecutor of Mr. 
Wilkes s estate and as an agent for Mrs. Wilkes. ld. at 2512-13, 399 N.E.2d at 
1050. Although the issue was not presented, the bank's role as both agent for the 
corporation in the stock purchase and coexecutor/agent for the Wilkes family in 
the sale of the stock may also raise questions regarding conflicts of interest resulting 
from the bank's multiple roles in these transactions. See note 30 infra for a dis-
cussion of conflicts of interest. 
\) ld. at 2512, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. 
10 ld. at 2513, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. 
11 ld. at 2512, 399 N.E.2d at 1050. 
12 ld. at 2513, 399 N.E.2d at 1051. 
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agreed to loan the corporation an additional $150,000 if all of the cor-
porate debt to the bank was secured by its receivables and if Slade, as 
president and chief executive officer, signed as guarantor of the cor-
poration's obligationsY Both Slade and the bank were aware at the 
time Slade signed the guaranty that unless the corporation could obtain 
the additional financing, it would be unable to meet its next payroll.H In 
light of these circumstances, Slade agreed to sign the guaranty.15 In the 
summer and fall of 1977, the bank collected $90,000 from funds of the 
corporation on deposit with the bank.! r. By October 1977 the corpora-
tion's cash flow had become critical, and the corporation executed an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors.17 At the commencement of the 
action, the corporation's outstanding debt to the bank was approximately 
$96,500.18 
The First National Bank brought a civil action in superior court against 
Slade to collect the unpaid obligations of P.S. Thorsen CO:19 The su-
perior court entered summary judgment in favor of the bank.20 The Su-
preme Judicial Court granted Slade's application for direct appellate 
review of his appeal and upheld judgment in favor of First National.21 
On appeal, Slade contended that he felt indirect pressure from the bank's 
voting control over the corporation in his execution of the guaranty.22 
Acknowledging that the bank had considerable influence upon the finan-
cial affairs of the corporation,23 the Court nevertheless ruled that there 
was no evidence that the bank had improperly used its control to obtain 
Slade's guaranty.24 The Court observed instead that the insistence by 
the bank of a guaranty was conduct as a creditor rather than as a trus-
tee.25 Noting Slade's knowledge and background as a businessman,26 
131d. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. Presumably these funds were collected by the bank pursuant to a right 
of set-off. Prior to the collections noted in the text, the bank also collected $30,000 
in payment for the shares purchased from the. Wilkes estate and from Mrs. Wilkes. 
ld. The bank instructed ,the corporation to cease making payments for the shares 
in June 1977-just before the bank began its collections of the $90,000. ld. 
17 ld. at 2513-14, 399 N.E.2d at 1051. 
18 ld. at 2514, 399 N.E.2d at 1051. 
19 ld. at 2509, 399 N.E.2d at 1049. 
20 ld. at 2509-10, 399 N.E.2d at 1049. 
21 Id. at 2510, 2511, 399 N.E.2d at 1049, 1050. 
22 ld. at 2514, 399 N.E.2d at 1051. 
231d. 
241d. 
25 ld. 
20 ld. at 2514-15 n.4, 399 N.E.2d at 1051-52 n.4. The Court concluded: "As an 
experienced businessman, Slade understood or should have understood the obligation 
that he was assuming." ld. at 2515 n.4, 399 N.E.2d at 1052 n.4. 
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the Court concluded that Slade had "knowingly and freely executed the 
guaranty." 27 
The Court, however, did consider the bank's status both as a creditor 
and as a trustee of the voting trust to be a potential conflict of interest 
requiring close scrutiny.28 Rejecting the bank's contention that the actions 
of its commercial loan department and its trust department should be 
viewed separately, the Court stated: "The bank is one entity and must 
take responsibility for the effect of its collective action." 29 Nevertheless, 
the Court found that the bank's dual role 3n "does not alone make [it] 
liable for all consequences adverse to Slade resulting from its conduct as 
a creditor." 31 Rather, the Court concluded that the appropriate standard 
is whether the bank, in its capacity as a creditor, breached any fiduciary 
duty owed to the beneficiaries of the voting truSt.32 
The Court enumerated three actions by the bank which could have 
violated its fiduciary duty to Slade as one of the voting trust beneficiaries: 
( 1) requiring Slade to guarantee the corporation's obligations, (2) ob-
taining a preferential status on its loan to the corporation, or (3) collect-
ing the corporation's obligations.3a Regarding the first two actions, the 
Court held that Slade had failed to demonstrate that these actions harmed 
the interests of the trust beneficiaries.S-! Lastly, the Court observed that 
the question was whether the bank's lawful actions as a creditor had 
violated a duty to Slade as a trust beneficiary.35 The Court resolved the 
issue in practical terms: 
27 ld. at 2514, 399 N.E.2d at 105!. 
28 ld. at 2514, 2516, 399 N.E.2d at 1051, 1052. 
29 ld. at 2515-16, 399 N.E.2d at 1052. See ge!1e1'aUy 2 A. Scon, TRUSTS 
§ 170.23A (3d ed. Supp. 1978). 
30 An interesting comparison can be made between the dual role of the bank 
in Slade and cases involving exchanges of confidential information between bank 
departments. Compare Slade with Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1101-1102, 1105 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (finding a breach of fiduciary obliga-
tion) and Am. Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 415 F. 
Supp. 5, 7, 9, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (finding no breach of fiduciary obligation). 
Slade might have been more successful had he produced evidence that information 
known to the bank through its trust department was conveyed to and used by its 
commercial loan department in its decision to collect the corporation's outstanding 
debt. See 465 F. Supp. at 1105. 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2516, 399 N.E.2d at 1052. 
32 ld. at 2511, 399 N.E.2d at 1053. The Court noted that in asserting that he 
could avoid liability to the. bank, Slade could not rely upon the rights of others. 
ld. at 2516, 399 N.E.2d at 1052. It was thus irrelevant that other creditors' rights 
may have been violated by the bank's alleged preferential claim to the corporation's 
assets. In fact, Slade stood to gain as guarantor from the bank having a superior 
claim over the corporation's general creditors. ld. at 2516 & n.5, 399 N.E.2d at 
1052 & n.5. 
33 ld. at 2511, 399 N.E.2d at 1053. 
34 ld. The Court noted that the loan did not destroy the corporation but rather 
"gave it life-prolonging, if not lifesaving, assistance." ld. 
311 ld. 
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A rule of law would be too harsh and impractical which failed to 
recognize that a commercial bank and a business clierit may wish to 
maintain a relationship which involves the bank, in its various as-
pects, in the operations of the business and in the esta!te planning of 
one or more owners of that business. If the parties vo~untarily enter 
into such an arrangement, the law should be hesitant, to deny them 
the right to develop and enforce the terms of their oWn agreements. 
At times, indeed, the multiple role of the bank ma~ prompt it to 
refrain from acting purely as a creditor, all to the advantage of the 
bank's customer and interested parties.36 
Since Slade, both as a corporate officer and as a trust bqneficiary, volun-
tarily accepted the bank's dual role as trustee of the vo~ing trust and as 
creditor of the corporation, the Court rejected Slade's! claim that the 
bank's actions as creditor were unlawful as to him.37 
In Slade, the Supreme Judicial Court attempted to bal~nce the interest 
in preventing trustees from assuming dual roles which! pose conflict of 
interest problems with the interest in allowing commercial banks and 
their clients flexibility in their business relationships. As a result of the 
decision, it appears that the Massachusetts courts wiU be hesitant to 
impose liability upon a bank which functions in a dual r~le with a client 
or trust beneficiary when the parties knOWingly and voltIntarily consent 
to the bank's multiple role. To establish such a breach o~ fiduCiary duty, 
the plaintiff must prove specific facts which demonstrat~ actual miscon-
duct by a bank in its dual capacities.3s 
The rule laid down by the Supreme Judicial Court places a greater 
burden upon the plaintiff trust beneficiary than the rul¢ in New York. 
In order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty in New Y~rk, the plaintiff 
need only show that a dual role with a potential coqHict of interest 
exists.39 Under the Slade rule, in Massachusetts the plaiJ(ltiff must estab-
86 ld. at 2518, 399 N.E.2d at 1053 (emphasis added). : 
37 ld. at 2518-19, 399 N.E.2d 1053-54. See generally 3 A. Sccin-r, TRUSTS § 216 
(3d ed. 1967) (no breach of trust if beneficiary has full knowledge of relevant facts 
of act or omission by trustee). The Court additionally justified :ts decision on the 
ground that Slade made no shOwing that the hank's collection f the corporation 
obligations caused the corporation to fail. "The bank's actio. of withdrawing 
financial support may have affected the date of the corporation's Idemise, but there 
is no representation of facts to show that the corporation wo~d have survived 
but for the bank's collection practices." 1979 Mass. Adv. 8h. at 12519, 399 N.E.2d 
~1~. ! 
38 1979 Mass. Adv. 8h. at 2511, 2516, 399 N.E.2d at 1050, 105$. 
89 The New York fidUCiary standard is that a trus,tee cannot O<1Cupy any position 
which has interests that may conflict with those of the .trust. 1 See, e.g., In the 
Matter of the Estate of William R. Grace, 42 Misc. 2d 214, 216, 247 N.Y.S.2d 695, 
697-98 (1964); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 ~.Y. 125, 131-32, 
51 N.E.2d 674, 675-76 (1943). • 
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lish not only that a dual role exists but also that the defendant abused 
its position to the detriment of the plaintiff trust beneficiary. Since the 
Slade Court partially based its decision upon Slade's consent and par-
ticipation in establishing the bank's trustee/ creditor role, the Court left 
unanswered the question whether a fiduciary holding corporate stock 
may also become a creditor of that corporation and exercise such creditor 
rights without becoming liable for breach of trust to a non-consenting, 
non-participating trust beneficiary.40 
§2.3. Fiduciary Duty-Closely held Corporations.... During the Survey 
year, the Appeals Court was faced in Hallahan v. Haltom Corp.l with a 
question of the appropriateness of injunctive relief to prevent a freeze-
out of the minority shareholders in a close corporation. Until the 1975 
decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Corp. of New England, Inc.,2 
the law afforded little protection to minority stockholders in a close cor-
poration against majority shareholders who voted their shares to deprive 
the minority of the benefits of corporate ownership.s In Donahue the Su-
preme Judicial Court abandoned this traditional approach, holding that 
stockholders in a close corporation owe one another substantially the 
same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe 
to one another.4 The Court in Donahue noted that a close corporation 
bears a striking resemblance to a partnership.5 The Court observed that, 
just as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders must 
be of trust, confidence, and absolute loyalty.6 Accordingly, the Court 
required that the stockholders in close corporations discharge their 
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict 
good faith standard.7 The Court concluded that denying a minority 
stockholder the opportunity to sell her shares to the corporation when 
the corporation had made such a purchase from a member of the con, 
trolling group was a violation of this good faith standard.8 To remedy 
this situation, the Court proposed either that the majority shareholder 
40 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2520, 399 N.E.2d at 1054. 
§ 2.3." By Clover M. Drinkwater-Lunn, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
I 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 207, 385 N.E.2d 1033. 
2 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
S F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.06 (1975). 
4 367 Mass. at 593, 328 N .E.2d at 515 (1975). For a detailed analysis of the 
case, see Elephante, Corporations, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.1, at 455-76. 
5 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 512. In arriving at this conclusion the Court 
for the first time defined a close corporation. It found a close corporation to have 
three characteristics: ( 1) few stockholders; (2) no ready market for corporate 
stock; (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management and 
operations of the corporation. Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. 
6 Id. at 587, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
7 Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
8 Id. at 603, 328 N .E.2d at 520. 
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be required to repurchase his shares or alternatively, that the corporation 
offer to the minority shareholder the Oppol1tunity to sell her shares to the 
corporation at the same price offered to the majority sha~eholder.9 
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,lO decided soon after 
Donahue, the Court held that when a close corporation provides income 
to its stockholders solely in the form of salaries, the dismissal of a stock-
holder by the controlling group for no legitimate busine~s purpose vio-
lates the fiduciary duty stockholders owe to one anothei'. In reaching 
this decision the Court noted that the shareholders' sole benefit from the 
corporation was derived in the form of salary.l1 The Court, emphasizing 
the devastating effect that employment termination would have on the 
interests of a minority stockholder whose sole benefit fro~ the corpora-
tion is thus derived,12 concluded that the majority sh~reholders had 
failed to demonstrate a business purpose for firing the minority stock-
holder-employee who had consistently performed his duties.13 The Court, 
therefore, held that ,the minority stockholder was entitled to damages 
from the majority stockholders.14 
Donahue and Wilkes made clear that a strict fiduciary duty is imposed 
on the shareholders in a close corporation. These cases also made it ap-
parent that damages 15 and some forms of injunctive relief 16 will be 
available to a beSieged minority shareholder. Yet the e*tent of the in-
junctive relief that a Massachussetts court would be willijlg to apply re-
mained undetermined until this Survey year. In Hallahan v. Haltom 
Corp., the Appeals Court confirmed the availability of injunctive relief 
and compelled a minority shareholder who had not benefited from the 
breach of fiduciary duty to sell his shares back to the corgoration,17 
, 
9 ld. at 603, 328 N.E.2d at 520-21. 
10 370 Mass. 842, 851-52, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976). For a detailed analysis 
of the case, see Elephante, Corporations, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 
265-71. 
11 370 Mass. at 853, 353 N.E.2d at 664. 
12 ld. See F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHQLDERS § 3.06, at 
78-80. i 
13 370 Mass. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 664. The Court stated that it would apply 
a two-part analysis to the actions of controlling shareholders. It would first ask 
whether the controlling group could demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for 
the action in question. If such a purpose were advanced, the *ority would be 
permitted to show that the same objectives could have been a~~ed through an 
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's interest. iThe court would 
then be required to weigh the legitimate business purpose aganst ithe practicability 
of a less harmful alternative. ld. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
14 ld. at 854, 353 N.E.2d at 664-65. 
15 ld. 
16 Donahue v. Rood Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 3$7 Mass. at 603, 
328 N.E.2d at 520-21. 
17 1979 Mass. App. at. Adv. Sh. at 211, 385 N.E.2d at 1035. 
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The corporation involved in Hallahan was formed from a previously 
established joint venture, a bar and restaurant launched by two sets of 
brothers, the Hallahans and the Thompsons.1s One hundred shares of 
stock were issued, each brother receiving 23% shares. 19 The remaining 
five shares went to David Thompson, a cousin of the Thompson brothers, 
as partial payment for carpentry work he had performed in renovating 
the premises. 20 The four venturers agreed that the cousin would not 
actively participate in the' business.21 It was Paul Hallahan's under-
standing that the power among the stockholders should remain equally 
divided between the two sets of brothers.22 David Thompson, however, 
signed an undated proxy, which contained no time limitation, in favor of 
one of the Thompson brothers.23 This proxy gave the Thompson bro-
thers majority control of the corporation. 
A few months after incorporation, disagreement arose between the two 
sets of brothers. The Thompson brothers called a stockholders meeting 
at one of the Hallahan homes without notice of the business to be trans-
acted.u At this meeting the Thompsons said they had received com-
plaints about the Hallahans' performance as bartenders.25 Because of 
these complaints, the Thompson brothers voted their shares and those 
of David Thompson to fire the Hallahans as employees of the corpora-
tion.26 The Hallahans insisted, however, that they had not received any 
complaints from either customers or the Thompsons prior to the meeting.27 
The Hallahan brothers filed an action in the Superior Court of Barn-
stable County. 28 In order to restore the balance of control originally 
envisioned by the brothers, the trial judge ordered David Thompson to 
return his five shares of stock to the corporation in exchange for $500.29 
From this judgment David Thompson appealed.30 
The Appeals Court upheld the trial judge'S order.31 At the outset the 
court found that the corporation formed by the Hallahans and Thomp-
18 Id. at 207, 385 N.E.2d at 1033. 
19 Id. at 208, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 209, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 207, 385 N.E.2d at 1033. The opinion is silent as to the type of relief 
sought. 
29 Id. at 209, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 211, 385 N.E.2d at 1035. 
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sons was a close corporation as defined in Donahue.32 As such, the court 
reasoned that the principal stockholders owed to each other and minority 
stockholders the rigorous fiduciary duty of partners and participants in 
a joint venture.3a The court held that the peremptory discharge of the 
Hallahans without warning, when salary as employees was their principal 
benefit from the corporation, fell short of the Donahue standard.34 Ap-
plying the Wilkes test, the court inquired whether the controlling group 
had demonstrated a legitimate business purpose for its action.35 The 
court found no such validating purpose in the unchallenged findings of 
the trial judge, which instead recited a seizure of control without prior 
warning.36 
After finding that the majority stockholders' actions had breached the 
fiduciary duty owed the majority, the Appeals Court considered the 
remedy ordered by the trial judge. The court noted that a stockholder 
in a corporation, in order to file a petition for dissolution under chapter 
156B, section 99 ( a), must own at least fifty per cent of the voting shares 
of that corporation. 37 It found that the trial judge orderecB. David Thomp-
son's five shares returned to the corporation in order td place the Hal-
lahan brothers in just such a position. 3 :l The $500 to be paid in exchange 
for the stock reflected the $100 per share repurchase value established in 
Haltom Corporation's articles of incorporation.39 The c@urt agreed that 
the sale ordered by the trial judge would restore the balance of control 
between the brothers that the parties had originally envisioned and which 
32 ld. at 209, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. For the Donahue definition of close corpo-
ration, see note 5 supra. 
33 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 209, 385 N.E.2d at 1034.' 
34 ld. at 209-10, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. The trial judge found. that the Haltom 
Corporation's net income at the end of its first full year was $7.00. ld. at 210 n.3, 
385 N.E.2d at 1034 n.3. 
35 ld. at 210, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
36 ld. 
37 ld., 385 N.E.2d at 1035. The statute provides in relevant Hart that a petition 
for dissolution of a corporation may be filed as follows: I 
(a) A corporation which desires to close its affairs may autll.orize the filing 
of such a petition by a vote of a majority of each class of its stock outstanding 
and entitled to vote thereon: 
(b) Such a petition may be £led by the holder or holders of not less than 
forty per cent of all the shares of its stock outstanding and /lntitled to vote 
thereon, . . . if: ! 
( 1) the directors are deadlocked in the management of cprporate affairs, 
and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, or 
( 2) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed to 
elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired 
upon the election of their successors. 
C.L. c. 156B, § 99(a)-(b). 
38 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 211, 385 N.E.2d at 1035. 
39 ld. 
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they had a fiduciary duty to one another to maintain.40 The Appeals 
Court found the judge's action to be consistent with the generic similar-
ities of the duties of the stockholders in a close corporation and partners 
in a partnership as defined by Donahue and Wilkes.41 It concluded that 
his order comported with a court's traditional equity power to remedy 
the wrong complained of and to make the decree effective.42 
The Appeals Court's decision in Hallahan is clearly consistent with the 
recent rulings of the Supreme Judicial Court in Donahue and Wilkes. 
As in Donahue, the Appeals Court in Hallahan required that the major-
ity stockholders discharge their responsibilities with utmost good faith.43 
Following Wilkes, the Hallahan court held that the freeze-out attempted 
by the Thompson brothers clearly violated this rigorous standard.44 In 
reaching its holding the Appeals Court emphaSized 45 many of the factors 
that were significant to the Wilkes court: the lack of business purpose 
behind the freeze-out, the absence of any benefit beyond salary that 
could be derived from corporate ownership, and the prior understand-
ings and intentions of all the parties as to control of the corporation.46 
Thus, in these respects, the Appeals Court's decision in Hallahan simply 
follows precedent. 
The injunctive remedy granted by the Hallahan court, however, differs 
significantly from the injunctive remedy awarded in Donahue. In Dona-
hue, the Court proposed that on remand the majority shareholder who 
had benefited from the breach of fiduciary duty be required to repay the 
purchase price of his shares to the corporation.47 In contrast, the court 
in Hallahan required a five per cent shareholder who had not benefited 
from the breach of fiduciary duty to sell his shares back to the corpora-
tion.48 In so dOing, the superior court apparently proceeded on the 
assumption that the plaintiff's ultimate goal was the dissolution of the 
corporation.49 The only way to return the Thompson and Hallahan bro-
thers to equal voting strength was to return David Thompson's shares 
to the corporate treasury. Apart from his executing a proxy to the 
Thompson brothers, however, it is not clear from the record that David 
Thompson was actively involved in or even aware of the Thompson 
brothers' attempt to unseat the Hallahans. Thus, it is possible that in 
40ld. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. 
43 ld. at 209, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
44 ld. at 209-10,' 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
45 ld. at 210-11, 385 N.E.2d at 1034. 
46 370 Mass. at 852-53, 353 N .E.2d at 664. 
47 367 Mass. at 603, 328 N.E.2d at 521. 
48 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 211, 385 N.E.2d at 1035. 
49 ld. 
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its attempt to restore the rights of two minority stockholders, the trial 
court completely eliminated the rights of a third party who was innocent 
of any wrongdoing. The Appeals Court nevertheless concluded that 
the trial court's order did not exceed the appropriate exercise of tradi-
tional equity powers.50 
The Appeals Court's ruling in Hallahan may be an iIldication of the 
types of remedies that Massachusetts courts will entertaln in the future 
with respect to close corporations. Traditionally, courts have been re-
luctant to order the performance of discretionary acts."l As a result, 
prior to Hallahan many minority stockholders found themselves without 
remedy when monetary damages were inadequate to re<llress the wrong 
complained of. ,,2 With this innovative injunctive relief, however, the 
trial court in Hallahan boldly injected itself into the area that most courts 
have sought to avoid. The Appeals Court's affirmance of the trial court's 
order may indicate that Massachusetts courts are interpreting the Dona-
hue and Wilkes courts' imposition of a rigorous stand~rd of fiduciary 
duty of stockholders of close corporations as a mandate to trial comis 
to cast aside their traditional reluctance to order injunctive relief. It is 
arguable that implicit in the concept of a duty of utmost care and loyalty 
among stockholders is the notion that when breaches of this duty arise, 
the injured party should be returned to the position h~ was in before 
the breach occurred. The mere ordering of monetary d4mages or of an 
injunction against a majority stockholder who has breached his fiduciary 
duty may be insufficient to do so, particularly where future employment 
is at stake. Thus, Hallahan v. Haltom Corp. may foreshadow a bolder 
approach to remedies in the area of close corporate litigation. 
§2.4. Appraisal of Stock Value. '" Sections 86 through 98 of the Mas-
sachusetts Business Corporation Law 1 provide for a single proceeding 
for determining the value of stock held by a dissenting minority share-
holder who demands payment for his shares. 2 During the Survey year, 
the Supreme Judicial Court first interpreted these sectiqns in Piemonte 
v. New Boston Garden Corp.,a an appeal from a judgm¢nt determining 
50 rd. 
51 Elephante, Corporations, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 271; see also 
F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, § 3.06, at 78-80 (1975). 
52 F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, § 31.06, at 80 (1975). 
§ 2.4. 0 By Barbara Jane Levine, staff member, ANNUAL SUR~EY OF MASSACHU-
SETTS LAW. 
1 C.L. c. 156B. This chapter was enacted in 1964 primarily to simplify 
the appraisal process of prior law under C.L. c. 156, §§ 46, 46E. No legislative 
intent to overrule the few appellate cases decided under c. 156 with the enactment 
of c. 156B has been found to exist. Piemonte v. New Boston C:ltrden Corp., 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 922, 926, 387 N.E.2d 1148-49. 
2 See Notes by Boston Bar Committee-1964, C.L. c. 156B, i§§ 86-98. 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 922, 387 N.E.2d 1145. 
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the fair value of the minority dissenters' stock in the Boston Garden Arena 
Corporation. The Court reviewed the procedures employed by the trial 
judge in valuing the plaintiffs' stock and held that the judge properly 
applied his discretion in the method he employed to value the stock.4 
Although provisions for stock appraisal vary from state to state;' most 
courts consider three principal elements: market value, earnings (or in-
vestment) value, and net asset value. (i The trial judge in Pie monte con-
sidered these there elements, following the "Delaware block approach." 7 
This approach to stock appraisal calls first for a determination of the 
three values and then an assignment of a percentage weight to each 
based on the relative importance of each element to the particular cor-
poration and to the industry in which the corporation operates.8 The 
Supreme Judicial Court approved this method, reasoning that since sec-
tions 86 through 98 were based in part on Delaware law,9 case law from 
that state is an appropriate guide In in the interpretation of the Massa-
chusetts provisions. l ! The specific challenges raised in Piemonte, how-
ever, did not concern the method of appraisal employed by the judge 
but rather the result of his appraisal. The plaintiff stockholders and the 
defendant corporation challenged both the values and the weight the 
·1 Id. at 924, 939, 387 N.E.2d at 1148, 1154. 
5 The provisions differ in large part on the circumstances creating the right 
of appraisal. In the last decade a trend has begun, although not followed in Massa-
chusetts, toward restricting the situations in which appraisal may be employed. 
When an appraisal right is not granted by statute, a minority dissenter must either 
accede to the corporate action or sell his shares on the market. See generally 
Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Share-
holder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1023 (1975-76). 
6 Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 
1453, 1457 (1966). Commentators have given two reasons for using these three 
principal elements. First, they are all said to reflect upon the proportional value of 
a share. Second, and possibly more importantly, they are mathematically ascertain-
able. There are other elements of value which can be considered-trend of opera-
tion and place in the industry, for example-but they are all intangibles and cannot 
be mathematically ascertained. They are nonetheless taken into account in the 
second stage of the appraisal when the three principal elements are weighted. 23 
Mo. L. REv. 223, 228 (1958). See Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Ap-
praisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1468 (1966). 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 925, 387 N.E.2d at 1148. 
8 Id.; Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. 
REv. 1453, 1457 (1966). 
9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262. 
10 The Court noted two major reasons why Delaware case law should not bind 
the Commonwealth in the interpretation of §§ 86-98. First, the Massachusetts 
provisions are similar, but not idenfical, to the Delaware provision. Second, the 
Court found that there was a lack of a legislative intent to adopt Delaware case law 
developed either prior to, or after, the enactment of G.L. c. 156B. 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 924, 925 n.4, 387 N.E.2d at 1148, 1148 n.4. 
11 Id. at 924, 387 N.E.2d at 1148. 
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judge assigned to the three elements.12 On appeal the Court considered 
the facts employed by the trial judge to determine a numerical value for 
each element to see if the judge abused his discretion in making his nu-
merical determinations. 
The stock of the Boston Garden Arena Corporation had been traded 
on the Boston Exchange only to a very limited extent.13 : Ninety percent 
of the stock was held by the company's controlling inteI1fsts.14 In 1972, 
before the proposed merger with the New Boston GarQen Corporation 
was announced to the public, the price of the stock ranged from $20.50 
to $29 per share. At the last trade, the price was $26.50.15 The trial 
judge found that this last figure represented the stock's mflrket value, and 
both parties objected.16 The minority shareholders cont~nded that since 
the stock was traded only on a limited basis, the stock's market value 
was not ascertainable and should have been disregardedY The de-
fendant corporation agreed that the market value used was erroneous 
but argued that the judge was obliged to reconstruct tl~e market value 
based on the price of stock of comparable companies.1S 
To these claims the Supreme Judicial Court stated that if no achlal 
market price exists, the trial judge may, but is not required, to recon-
struct the market value.l!l The Court further noted that under Delaware 
12 ld. at 926, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. A challenge was also ~de to the judge's 
consideration of certain evidence which the defendant thought should have been 
excluded and to the judge's decision on the rate. of interest to be allowed to the 
plaintiffs. ld. In discussing the propriety of the award of interest at eight per 
cent a year, the Court states that the interest rate chosen should r~Hect the fact that 
the corporation had use of the minority dissenter's money during i the appraisal pro-
ceeding. From a conservative Viewpoint, the Court stated tha~ the interest rate 
should reHect the rate of interest of a prudent investment. ld. at 938-39, 387 N.E.2d 
at 1154. For a detailed discussion ,on interest awards pursuant to stock appraisals, 
see Grant, Appraisal Rights: Allowance for Pre;udgment Interest, 17 B.C. IND. & 
CoM. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
13 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 927-28, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. at 926, 928, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
17 ld. at 926, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
IS ld. at 927, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
19 ld. There are a number of approaches to reaching a hypothetical market value. 
One approach compares the close corporation to "similar" public corPorations-similar 
in the sense that they are in the same industry, with a similar position in that 
industry, equivalent assets, earnings, and sales. Another, per~ps more realistic, 
approach takes into account net assets and capitalized earnings. Indeed, the Court 
in Piemonte noted that "the process of the reconstruction of market value may 
actually be no more than a variation on the valuation of corporate assets and corpo-
rate earnings." ld. Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Appraisal Statutes,79 
HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1463 (1966). See Application of Delaware jRacing Ass'n, 213 
A.2d 203 (Del. 1965) (although stock appraiser concluded market rrice to be $1,530 
a share, market price reconstructed <to be $1,305 a share <to reHept subsequent de-
cline in earnings). 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/5
§2.4 CORPORATIONS 35 
law, market value is only reconstructed when actual market value cannot 
be determined and when a hypothetical market value can be mathe-
matically constructed. 20 The Court did not elaborate on this point, how-
ever, since it found that the trial judge had not abused his discretion by 
employing the actual market price instead of reconstructing it. The Court 
considered it within the trial judge's discretion to conclude both that a 
sufficient volume of trading existed to indicate accurately a market value 
and that an actual value is preferable to a reconstructed sales price.21 
In addition, the Court found the ten percent weight given to this value 
appropriate to reflect the thin trading in the stock.22 
The second measure of the stock's value under the Delaware block 
approach applied in Pie monte is the corporation's earning capacity, or 
investment value. This measure is intended to reflect that price which 
a willing buyer would pay for the company.23 Two steps are involved in 
determining this second element. The first step requires the averaging of 
the corporation's earnings for the past five years.24 If earnings reflect 
the proceeds of a transaction which was extraordinary and outside of 
normally transacted business,25 the gains or losses attributable to such a 
transaction are excluded from the computation.26 In the case at bar, the 
judge included in his calculation of earning capacity payments which 
had been received by the corporation from teams newly admitted to the 
National Hockey League during two of the five years.27 The defendant 
corporation argued that these figures inflated the earnings value of the 
corporation. The Court, however, found no abuse of the trial judge's 
discretion to include or exclude transactions according to whether they 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 927 n.7, 387 N.E.2d at 1149 n.7. See Sporberg v. City 
Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956) (no market value 
ascertainable) . 
21 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 928, 387 N.E.2d at 1149. 
22 ld. at 937, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. See Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. 
Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (1965) (where company's dividend record bore a ten per cent 
weight to market value appropriate). 
23 Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 
1453, 1464 (1966). 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 928, 387 N.E.2d at 1150. Delaware law requires this 
value be measured in terms of historical earnings rather than prospective earnings, 
and the period of five years is the standard period used. Application of Delaware 
Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203, 212 (Del. 1965). The purpose behind the averaging of 
five years is to minimize the impact of extraordinarily good or bad years. Adams v. 
R.C. Williams & Company, 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797, 800 (1960) (two-year 
time period too short). ct. Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 47, modified on 
rehearing, 136 N.W .2d 280 (Iowa 1965) (ten-year period too long). 
25 The sale of a major branch of the corporation's business is an example of such 
a transaction. Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 468-70 (Del. Ch. 
1975). 
26 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 929, 387 N.E.2d at 1150. 
27 ld. at 931, 387 N.E.2d at 1151. See note 6 supra. 
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properly reHect the corporation's earning capacity.28 '!the defendant cor-
poration also contended that the investment value df the corporation 
should include its dividend record. Stating that dividends tend to reHect 
the same factors as earnings, the Court found no need to give the divi-
dend value independent weight. 2fl Moreover, since dividend policies 
clearly playa role in the market price of stock, the corporation's low and 
sporadic dividend rate already was accounted for in tqe appraised value 
of the stock. 30 
Once the corporation's average earnings have been computed, the se-
cond step in determining investrrient value of a corporation is to apply 
a capitalization factor, or a multiplier, to the earnings I figure. 31 ReHect-
ing the certainty and stability of the corporation's pr@spective financial 
condition, the capitalization factor will be low if future earnings are not 
promising and high if they are.32 The Supreme Judicial Court left the 
assignment of the capitalization factor within the trial judge's discre-
tion. 33 The trial judge in Piemonte had weighed the favorable financial 
prospects of the Boston Bruins against the negative flnancial prospects 
and had concluded that a capitalization factor of ten was appropriate.34 
The Court affirmed this conclusion.35 
The net asset value is the third principal element considered under the 
approach to stock appraisal applied by the Piemonte Court. Net asset 
value represents the corporation's current worth or! "going concern" 
value.36 The Boston Garden Arena Corporation owned all the stock in 
the subsidiary corporations that owned, respectively, the Boston Bruins, 
a franchise in the National Hockey League, and the Boston Braves, a 
franchise in the American Hockey League. The corporation also owned 
, 
28 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 931, 387 N.E.2d at 1151. The trial judge noted that 
since expansion of the National Hockev League was projected in the immediate 
future, the defendant corporation would be receiving additional payments in sub-
sequent years. Id. 
29 Id. at 930, 387 N.E.2d at 1150. 
30 Id. . 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 929, 387 N.E.2d at 1150. 
32 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 
(Del. 1975). 
33 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 929, 929 n.9, 387 N.E.2d at 1150, 1150 n.9. The 
Court did state, however, that the capitalization chart upon ~hich the Delaware 
courts have relied in the past, see 1 A.S. DeWing, THE FINANqIAL POLICY OF COR-
PORATIONS 390-91 (5th ed. 1953), but see Universal City Studips, Inc. v. Francis I. 
duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 219, 219 n.3 (Del. 1975), was otltdated. 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 929 n.9, 387 N.E.2d at 1150 n.9. 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 930,387 N.E.2d at 1150. 
35 Id. The Court added that the judge could have compared the price-earnings 
ratio of other corporations but need not do so in reaching his c~nclusion of the cor-
rect multiplier. Id., 387 N.E.2d at 1150. 
36 See Note, Valuation of Dissenter Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. 
REV. 1453, 1457 (1966). . 
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and operated concessions at the Boston Garden.37 In determining the 
net asset value for the corporatiOl~, the trial judge valued the net assets of 
the parent corporation separately from the assets of the Bruins' franchise 
and the concession operation ~H and then added the three values.39 Chal-
lenging this sum, the defendant corporation contended that by separating 
the net assets value into three sources the judge included some items 
twice-particularly the goodwill of the Bruins, net player investment, 
and the value of the American Hockey League franchise.40 The Court 
found, however, that the trial judge had not included these values in his 
detemlination of the Bruins' franchise and therefore had properly in-
cluded them in the figure representing the net asset value of the parent 
corporation.41 The defendant further argued that no separate value 
should have been given to the concession operation.~2 The Court ac-
knowledged that the value had been included in the eaming capacity 
figure. Nevertheless, it concluded that the value of the concession opera-
tion also had an asset component.4 :l The defendant had purchased the 
concession rights as an asset before it purchased the real property on 
which the concessions were operated. This purchase demonstrated that 
the concession operation had a value independent of the value of the 
defendant's real estate.44 
After considering the evidence presented at trial and applying the 
above-described techniques, the judge found a market value of $26.50, 
an eamings value of $52.60 and a net asset value of $103.16.45 These 
raw figures represent different elements inherent in the value of the cor-
37 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 923, 387 N.E.2d at 1147. 
38 See note 6 supra. 
39 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 931-32, 387 N.E.2d at 1151. 
40 rd. at 932, 387 N.E.2d at 1151. 
41 rd. Since the judge on remand might choose to include these values in his 
redetermination of the value of the Bruins' franchise, an adjustment to the figure 
representing the parent corporation's net asset value may be necessary. rd. at 933 
n.12, 387 N.E.2d at 1151 n.12. 
42 rd. at 932, 387 N.E.2d at 1151. 
43 Id. at 935, 387 N.E.2d at 1152. 
44 Id. at 935-36, 387 N.E.2d at 1152-53. The Court, however, was unsure of 
the reason why the judge accepted the plaintiff's evidence of the operation's value 
and remanded the issue for further consideration. The Court noted that even 
though the defendant failed to offer evidence on this issue, the judge is not bound 
to accept the plaintiff's evidence at face value but should exercise his own judgment 
concerning the expert witness's testimony. The Court added, however, that the 
judge may well reaffirm his previous determination of the concession operation's net 
asset value. Id. at 936, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. The Court also remanded the deter-
minations made of the value of the Boston Garden and the Bruins franchise, in 
response to the plaintiff's argument that these assets were undervalued. Id. at 932-
35, 387 N.E.2d at 1151-52. Thus, although several issues were remanded for recon-
sideration, the Court accepted the judge's overall method of determining the net 
assets component. 
45 Id. at 924 n.3, 387 N.E.2d at 1148 n.3. 
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poration's stock. The figures must be balanced, howeverj by applying a 
percentage weighting process which, according to the P'iemonte Court, 
it is within the judge's discretion to compose.4f; In Piernonte, because 
of the thin trading of the stock, the judge attributed. a ten percent 
weight to the market value.47 The judge also conclude~ that the cor-
poration's value depended more on its assets than its earnings and as-
signed weights of fifty percent and forty percent, respectively.48 
Under most circumstances in Massachusetts where a minority stock-
holder dissents from a proposed corporate activity, the stockholder's sole 
remedy is to demand payment from the corporation for lHs stock's value 
as set out in Pie monte and thereby terminate his interest in the corpora-
tion.40 Where, however, the proposed corporate activity will be or is 
illegal as to the dissenting stockholder, the last section of. the Massachu-
setts appraisal provisions, section 98, entitles the stockholder to other 
relief.50 In Pupecki v. James Madison Corp.;i1 a case decided during 
the 1978 Survey year, the stockholder alleged that payments to the con-
trolling stockholder following the sale of the corporatiori were actually 
in consideration of the corporation's assets and not for the employment 
and noncompetition agreements made between the coJiltrolling stock-
holder and the new corporate owners.":! The Supreme iJudicial Court 
held that if the allegations were proved, the payments wjould constitute 
a diversion of corporate property-an illegal and fraudulent action by 
the controlling stockholder as to the minority dissenter.! If such were 
the case, the dissenting stockholder's action to rescind all the agreements 
that transferred the corporation's assets to the new owneIis would be al-
lowed.53 Alternatively, if the allegations were not proved~ the dissenting 
stockholder's remedy would be limited under section 98 to appraisal of 
his shares. 54 Whether the allegations were true remaine~ a factual is-
sue, and the case was remanded for trial:>5 
<l6 ld. at 937-38,387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
<l7 ld. at 937, 387 N.E.2d at 1153. 
~M , 
49 Cf. Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception ~o the Dissenting 
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (1975-76) (in other states 
where stock is listed on a stock exchange or is otherwise actively tr~ded remedy may 
be limited to sale of stocIe on the market). i 
110 G.L. c. 156B. § 98 (1964). ' 
51 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2340, 382 N.E.2d lO3O. 
52 ld. at 2345,382 N.E.2d at 1033. 
113 Id. at 2342, 2345, 382 N.E.2d at 1032-33. 
114 ld. at 2344-45, 382 N.E.2d at 1033. 
115 Id. at 2346-47, 382 N.E.2d at 1033-34. The case dealt wi~ some additional 
issues not pertaining to the appraisal provision, including wheth~r the necessary 
requirements for a derivative suit on a corporation's behalf were I satisfied by the 
minority stoclcholder and whether the suit was champertous. ld. iat 2347-49, 382 
N.E.2d at 1034. ' 
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Both Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corporation and Pupecki v. 
James Madison Corporation shed some light on the appraisal provisions 
of chapter 156B, sections 86 through 98. Of foremost importance is the 
Supreme Judicial Court's sanction of Delaware law as persuasive.50 Use 
of the Delaware block approach for appraisal allows the dissenting stock-
holder to receive the full, equitable value of his stock and not just the 
market price which, as illustrated in Pie monte, may not be reflective of 
the true worth of an interest in an on-going corporation. In addition, 
although appraisal provisions were originally intended to keep minority 
stockholders from seeking to enjoin certain corporate activities by allow-
ing them to disengage themselves from the corporation in an equitable 
manner,5i proof of corporate illegality or fraud as to the minority stock-
holder will leave open the door to injunctive relief. 
50 For examples of other issues which have arisen under Delaware law, see gen-
erally Kerr and Letts, Appraisal Procedures for Delaware Stockholders, 20 Bus. LAW. 
1083 (1965). 
57 See generally Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for 
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962). 
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